• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Marine Corps, Navy Remain Split Over Design, Number of Future Light Amphibious Warship, Divide Risks Stalling Program

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
14,737
Points
1,160
These look like really good landing craft....



The Marine Corps and Navy remain at an impasse over the future of the Light Amphibious Warship, as skepticism about the program’s viability mounts due to the internal division, sources familiar with the program have told USNI News.

While the Marines remain committed to their plan for nearly three-dozen beachable ships that can ferry units between islands and shorelines in the Pacific, the Navy wants fewer. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday’s 2022 navigation plan, unveiled in late July, calls for 18 LAWs.

“It’s obviously a big battle within the Marine Corps on where the Marine Corps’s headed and whether the Navy really supports LAW or not,” said one person familiar with the discussions on LAW.

But as recently as last week, the Marine Corps said it wants as many as 35 LAWs to achieve its vision for operations in the Indo-Pacific, which would include smaller units moving between islands and setting up ad-hoc bases from where they could fire anti-ship missiles off of the chassis of a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.


 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Relic
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
4,696
Points
1,060
The division between the two services largely comes down to survivability, or what types of weapons and armors to place on a ship that would operate in the first island chain, within range of Chinese missiles.

Adding more weapons and armor to LAW makes the ship more expensive. Projections in 2020 called for each LAW to cost $100 million, a number described as unrealistic by the person familiar with program discussions. Now the Marine Corps wants the ship to cost around $150 million a piece so it can buy more of them, while the Navy is pushing for a more survivable ship that would end up costing about $300 million each..

And this is where the Littoral Combat Ship went down the hole. And the Joint High Speed Vessel got transferred to the USNS.

The Marines want a transport. Like a floating Super Stallion. The Navy won't supply sailors unless the hull can fight.
 

Colin Parkinson

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
4,893
Points
1,160

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
5,987
Points
1,040
That's crazy talk...
Really a very interesting capability. Back in the late 70's I was part of a staff tour visiting Fort Eustis and their Logistic branch's railroad and terminal battalion organizations. The ship to shore organizations with a variety of ships and boats were an eye opener as were all the hulls around the corner which were part of the Navy's reserve fleet.

🍻
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Relic
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
4,696
Points
1,060
There is a solution to this, hire the US Army to do it.

I believe the Army uses Warrant Officers to command those Landing Ships. Not Commissioned Officers.

I also believe that there is some crossover in design specs between the Light Amphibious Warship and the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel.

LUSV - "The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons,"

LAW - "As it stands, LAW is “going to be between 200 to 400 feet long, roughly 3,000 to 4,000 tons and carrying [8,000] to 10,000 square feet of cargo."

"The services pitch LAW as a medium amphibious warship with a small crew that can haul 75 Marines from shore to shore without tying up the Navy’s larger amphibious ships for smaller operations, for the price tag of $150 million or less per hull."


There is not a world of difference between the LAW artwork and the reality of the LUSVs employed on RIMPAC this year.


1663338117779.png1663338194351.png

Maybe the LUSV can morph into an Optionally manned vessel, designated as a boat and commanded by a Bos'n with a crew of 3 or 4.

Or perhaps it goes this direction and gets owned by Military Sealift Command



1663338368266.png

"MSC reports to the Department of Defense's Transportation Command for defense transportation matters, to the Navy Fleet Forces Command for Navy-unique matters, and to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) for procurement policy and oversight matters.[6]"

The JHSV entered service because the USMC really liked Austal's Westpac Express

Westpac Express is capable of sustaining loaded speeds of 35 knots, and can rapidly deploy most of a marine battalion -- up to 970 marines plus vehicles and equipment -- in a single lift. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) first chartered her to operate with the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in July 2001 for a ‘proof of concept’ period, subsequently extending the charter. Originally described as a “theatre support vessel,” the MSC gradually shifted her role and now more commonly refers to Westpac Express as a “high speed connector.”

“Instead of a two week process to deploy by air lift,” CW05 Roger G. Rose, Surface Embarkation Officer, III MEF G-4, Strategic Mobility Office, evaluated one such deployment in 2006, “Westpac Express moved the unit’s 843 marines, 63 vehicles, and 27 containers of baggage and cargo in 30 hours. Instead of a price-tag of over $500,000 for one-way transportation requiring at least 16, C-17 airlifts, Westpac Express did the round trip lift for $130,000.”

 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
14,737
Points
1,160
That's crazy talk...

Just don't remind the US Marines who managed most of the amphibious training during WW2 ;)

Engineer Special Brigade​

At the onset of direct American involvement in World War II, it became apparent that the United States would need a large strategic and tactical amphibious warfare capability. In 1941, the amphibious forces were divided into two corps: one in the Atlantic, and one in the Pacific. Both were combined United States Army and United States Marine Corps commands, administered by the United States Navy. The Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, consisted of the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division, while the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, consisted of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Marine Division.[1]

In April 1942, the United States and United Kingdom agreed on plans for an emergency invasion of Northwest Europe in the late northern summer of 1942 (Operation Sledgehammer) that would be conducted in the event of signs that the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse, or that the Germans were withdrawing from Western Europe, possibly due to an internal coup or collapse. This would be followed by a full-scale crossing of the English Channel in mid-1943 (Operation Roundup). These were envisaged as shore-to-shore operations. The US Navy's policy at this time of only taking volunteers meant that it was short of manpower, and those personnel it had available were mainly allocated warships and the amphibious ships required for ship-to-shore operations. This meant that the landing craft for Sledgehammer would have to be operated by the British and the US Army.[2][3]


 
Top